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Abstract: In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the status of 
early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on presumptions about 
the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific 
criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous 
status of embryos. This view, which uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning, 
promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos with the 
certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-
life view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and 
cannot be used to limit destructive research on human embryos. 
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Introduction 
Human embryos in the early stages of development are ontologically ambiguous entities.1 
This ontological ambiguity of early embryos, which has been discussed by some philosophers 
and bioethicists [1, 2], although not recognized by the majority of pro-life followers, is an 
underlying reason for the uncertainty about the moral status of human embryos. What is the 
morally permitted way of acting in the face of uncertainty about the moral status of some 
beings? Does this uncertainty ‘cast serious doubt on the arguments claiming … full 
protection’ [3, p. 153] of embryos, or is it the other way around: does it give a reason for 
acting in a cautious way and treating these entities as if they had very high or even full moral 
                                                          
1 In this article, the term ‘‘embryo’’ refers to the entity that precedes a human being until the time the 
primitive streak starts to develop (about 2 weeks after fertilization) 
status? In this article, I will argue that the uncertainty about the moral status of the entity 
we are dealing with sometimes, indeed, gives us a reason to act in a precautionary way. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be a reason for granting unconditional full protection to embryos, 
which could result, for example, in banning research on human embryos or in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) procedures.  
 
The standard interpretations of the pro-life views  
The dominant view in recent Western moral sensibility is that human embryos have a special 
status, but not as high as that of children or adults. This means that the embryos’ right to life 
(especially in the early stages of development) can be weighed against some individual or 
societal benefits in a way that the right to life of children or adults cannot be. This view is 
present in many societal practices (e.g., the acceptance of „morning-after pills” that destroy 
early embryos, not caring about massive early embryo loss, etc.) as well as in the legal 
regulations of many European states where destructive research on early human embryos is 
legally permitted if it serves important scientific purposes. In most European states research 
is permitted only on embryos that are no longer needed for reproduction, but in some, 
permission is extended to embryos created specifically for research (e.g., Belgium, Sweden, 
the UK) [4]. Even in those states where embryo protection seems to be much more intense 
and embryo research is prohibited (e.g., Austria, Ireland, Poland), embryos are not treated 
by the law as having full moral status or a full right to life from the very beginning (e.g., the 
law in these countries accepts the sacrifice of embryos during IVF procedures for individual 
reproductive purposes). The view that ascribes gradual moral status to embryos also has a 
strong historical background within the Catholic tradition, at least up until the end of the 
19th century [5]. 
Some opponents of destructive embryonic research claim that every human embryo 
should be treated as having full moral status and a full right to life. If this is correct, the 
justification for destructive embryonic research should be similar to the justification that 
permits killing a human adult. But there is full agreement in medical ethics that it is morally 
wrong (and that it should not be legally permitted) to intentionally kill an adult human being 
in order to pursue medical research (as well as for any reason other than self-defense). 
Moreover, for the supporters of prolife views, destructive embryo research or IVF should be 
morally worse than some cases of abortion (e.g., those performed because of self-defense 
reasons), as these procedures result in the deliberate creation of embryos that are either 
destroyed for experiments or abandoned for reproductive purposes.  
How should one understand the pro-life view, which claims that the moral status of 
embryos and adult human beings are equal? The most influential justification is the 
theological argument given by current Catholic doctrine. The recent instruction Dignitas 
Personae published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 2008 claims that 
“the human embryo has…, from the very beginning, the dignity proper to a person” [6]. The 
same position can be found in many earlier documents of the Catholic Church (e.g., in 
Donum Vitae published in 1987: “the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its 
existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the 
unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual 
totality” [7]; a very similar claim may be found in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae published 
in 1995 [8, section 60]). “The very beginning” or „the first moment” is commonly understood 
as the moment of fertilization (or an equivalent process, e.g., nuclear transfer). What does it 
mean to have „the dignity proper to a person”? The Catholic Church adopts a standard 
definition of a person proposed by Boethius: „an individual substance of a rational nature” 
(naturae rationalis individua substantia). One contemporary Thomist interprets this formula 
as follows: „a person must consist of one, ongoing ontology and a soul which endows it with 
the powers of rationality, i.e., intellect” [9, p. 140]. These three requirements (unicity, 
ontological continuity, and an intellectual soul) are necessary requirements for a being to 
have the status of a person. 
The theological justification is important, since it is intertwined with philosophical 
justifications of the pro-life view (see, e.g., [10–12]). Even if some of these philosophical 
justifications do not appeal to theologically loaded concepts, like those of „soul” or „person,” 
they share with the theological justifications a commitment to substance ontology, which is 
the claim that „human” is „a substance concept” and an entity becomes a human substance 
in one discrete event [13]. This kind of approach says that human beings have some 
substantial properties (as opposed to accidental) that indicate what kind of beings they are. 
Although this position by itself does not justify the ascription of moral status (one might 
accept a „substance ontology” and yet think that moral status is a human projection), it is 
commonly used by philosophers defending the pro-life view. Substance ontology seeks to 
determine either the exact moment when a human being comes into existence or the 
process in which it emerges: before and after this there are two different entities. Moreover, 
each being must also be distinct from all other entities: e.g., when a human embryo splits to 
form identical twins, substance ontology would claim that either one being ceased to exist 
and that two new beings appeared in its place or that an original being survives the 
twinning, but a second individual emerges alongside it. Some philosophers claim that 
advances in biology can help to identify the moment (e.g., of the fusion of the nuclei) when a 
human being begins. In the opinion of those who defend the pro-life view, the process of 
fertilization (or some moment during it) marks when a new substance comes into being 
(although they can disagree whether it happens during the fusion of the sperm and egg, the 
fusion of the nuclei, or the first cell division). In the case of cloning, the joining of the nucleus 
and the enucleated egg marks this moment and therefore cloned embryos ought to be 
treated as having the same moral status as other human embryos [14, p. 4]. There is also an 
additional pragmatic reason for treating fertilization as the moment of substantial change: 
since embryonic development occurs along a continuum, it is impossible to make any 
convincing distinction at any other point in this process (this argument is also visible in the 
Declaration on Procured Abortion published in 1974: „It [a new human being] would never 
be made human if it were not human already” [15]). Therefore, we should accord human 
embryos full moral status from the moment an oocyte is fertilized or nuclear transfer takes 
place.  
Proponents of the pro-life view who justify their views either on theological or 
philosophical grounds assume that the essential qualities of the intellectual soul or the 
human organism do not have to be actualized for a person to be present, since human 
embryos are organisms that, from the very beginning, have potentiality to develop into an 
adult human being. They adopt so-called active potentiality: the actualization of potentiality 
arises from the nature of the entity itself, without dependence on external causes. The 
distinction between active and passive potentiality helps to explain why a human embryo 
has full moral status but human gametes do not (they have only passive potentiality). There 
are also other reasons why the notion of potentiality is important: the cells in a human being 
do not differ in the genetic information they contain but only in the subset of the genes they 
express. One could ask, why do most proponents of the pro-life view not ascribe full moral 
status to any single human cell except the one-celled embryo? The answer could be that the 
fertilized egg is unique because, unlike somatic cells, it possesses an active potentiality to 
develop into an organism using its own genetic information [10, p. 53]. Therefore, the strict 
ontology and the concept of active potentiality help to maintain that it is wrong to kill an 
embryo, since „she is identical to an entity that, at some time later in her development, 
everyone agrees it is wrong to kill” [11, p. 249]. 
 
Some problems with the standard interpretations  
A well-known reason for the uncertainty about the moral status of early human embryos is 
the ambiguity concerning their ontological status, especially their capacity for splitting and 
recombination. Early embryos can be teased into two or more parts, each of which can 
develop into a fetus. Conversely, two different embryos may fuse and develop into one fetus 
and then an adult human being with cells containing two different DNAs, which sometimes 
happens naturally and often results in genetic disorders, but many human chimeras are 
completely healthy and unaware of their genetic condition. This is one reason why even 
some Catholic scholars claim that early human embryos cannot have souls until after the 
second week of fertilization, when the primitive streak begins to form. The proponents of 
„delayed animation” underline the fact that the moment of ensoulment must coincide with 
the formation of an ontological individual [16, 17]. The capacity for splitting and 
recombination and the possible lack of ontological continuity is also a reason why some 
philosophers who defend a pro-life view on abortion do not ascribe full moral status to early 
embryos [18].  
The second reason for the uncertainty about the moral status of early human 
embryos is related to the high rate of their „mortality”: about 50–80 % of embryos naturally 
die within the first few hours or days after conception. Thus, the proponents of the pro-life 
view are vulnerable to the critique that they do not in fact ascribe as high a moral status to 
embryos as they verbally claim. If they in fact think that embryos have full moral status, why 
do they not care about the more than 200 million „young and innocent” beings dying every 
year after a very short life? Why do they not call for global research programs that could 
improve the embryos’ survival rate? A philosopher who has recently discussed this problem 
writes that „finding means of saving even 5 % of embryos from spontaneous abortion would 
save more lives than a cure for cancer” [19, p. 15]. It seems that everybody, including 
hardline pro-life thinkers, accept that procreation involves the (intentional) creation and 
(non-intentional, but easy to foresee) destruction of many embryos no matter if the 
fertilization occurs in vitro or in vivo: „a mother of three children could be expected to have 
also had approximately five spontaneous abortions” [19, p. 13]. It is extremely hard to justify 
that creating some entities and then letting them die at a very young age is permissible as 
part of a procreative project if these entities indeed had a moral status equal to that of an 
adult human being. This is why one Thomist scholar recently came to the conclusion that: „it 
seems odd to believe that God … would permit the needless death of so many persons. It 
seems more reasonable to conceive of them as naturally rejected biological material—not 
persons” [9, p. 156]. 
Thirdly, assuming the existence of a rational „soul” from the very moment of 
conception (and thereby the beginning of personhood) plays a much less important role 
within the Catholic tradition than is commonly thought [20]. The official teaching of the 
Catholic Church on prenatal life explicitly recognizes this philosophical uncertainty about the 
beginning of ensoulment, which makes many pro-lifers holier than the Pope. or example, in 
the Declaration on Procured Abortion, the Congregation states, „this declaration expressly 
leaves aside the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a 
unanimous tradition on this point and authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates 
from the first instant; for others it could not at least precede nidation” [15]. This position is 
sustained in all official documents. For example, in 1987 in Donum Vitae, the Congregation, 
on the one hand, wrote that „the conclusions of science regarding the human embryo 
provide a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the 
moment of this first appearance of a human life,” but on the other hand, it does not confirm 
explicitly that embryos are persons: „The Magisterium has not expressly committed itself to 
an affirmation of a philosophical nature” (that is, whether early embryos have souls) [7]. This 
position was repeated by John Paul II in 1995 in Evangelium Vitae [8, sec. 60], and in 2008 by 
the Congregation in Dignitas Personae, which interprets this view explicitly: „Donum Vitae, 
in order to avoid a statement of an explicitly philosophical nature, did not define the embryo 
as a person” [6]. Some commentators argue that this last fragment „pull[s] back from a 
growing trajectory in the Church’s teaching, from debates over ensoulment to the benefit-
of-the-doubt approach taken by the CDF [the Congregation] in its 1974 Declaration on 
Procured Abortion and the more robust (albeit interrogative) defense of the personhood of 
the embryo during the pontificate of John Paul II” [21, p. 314], but it seems that the constant 
avoiding of the definition of an embryo as a person by the Congregation or the successive 
popes is clear evidence that there is no substantial shift of views between 1974 and 2008. 
Why does the Congregation claim, on the one hand, that human embryos „have 
dignity proper to a person” and should be treated as persons from the very moment of 
conception, but on the other hand, does not support „conceptionism” explicitly (i.e., the 
view that ensoulment takes place during conception)? How is it possible to combine 
certainty about normative obligations with uncertainty about ontological status, as is 
expressed, for example, in this fragment of the Declaration on Procured Abortion: „From a 
moral point of view this is certain: even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of 
conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder” 
[15]? 
The standard interpretation claims that the argument from active potentiality must 
again appear on the stage: even if we are not sure whether an early embryo has a soul, we 
are certain that it is „a human life, preparing for and calling for a soul” [15] (in other Church 
documents an early embryo is also called: „a human being”) and thus it possesses 
capabilities that will be exercised later, but which make it a person now. What does it mean 
that an embryo is „a human life” or „a human being”? The simplest answer is that it is an 
organism that contains the human genome. Does it mean that the uncertainty about the 
moment of ensoulment does not have to coincide with uncertainty about the existence of 
human life? Theoretically, it is possible to be certain that some organism is „a human life,” 
but at the same time to be uncertain whether it has a rational soul, since this would only 
„prepare for” it and „call for” it. But this would not be a proper interpretation of the Catholic 
view. According to the Thomistic metaphysics adopted by the recent Catholic documents, all 
human beings are persons, and it is not possible to have the ontological status of a human 
life without an intellectual soul which must inform the matter of each human being [22]. 
Therefore, the standard interpretation does not explain the rigid stance of pro-lifers against 
human embryo research in the face of uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos 
which is recognized even within the Catholic doctrine. 
 
The argument from normative uncertainty (ANU) 
I will argue that in the case of early embryos there exists a strong pro-life argument based on 
the criteria of rational action under uncertainty that can easily explain the rigid stance of 
pro-lifers against human embryo research even in the face of their uncertainty about the 
ontological status of embryos. It is strong because (1) it does not require the acceptance of 
Thomistic metaphysics or any other substance ontology, (2) it avoids the unsolvable 
discussion about the moment of ‘ensoulment’ or about the beginning of personhood, (3) it 
does not depend on claims about the ontological status of embryos and their identity 
through time with the human beings they precede, and (4) it is able to bypass the notorious 
problem of potentiality. 
The case of early embryos I discuss here is a manifestation of the broader problem of 
our moral fallibility and meta-reasoning in making moral decisions [23–25]. So, this 
discussion may have interesting applications to other cases of normative uncertainty 
because even when we feel quite certain about moral issues, we are susceptible to moral 
mistakes, and we need to have a method to deal with the possibility that we will get some 
crucial moral issues wrong. For example, we have to act very often in the face of uncertainty 
about moral doctrines, specific moral duties, or the ontological status of some entities. In 
this last case, we may have our doubts because (1) we may be unsure when they begin to 
belong to some ontological class, or (2) they are difficult to classify, or, last but not least, (3) 
our ontological classifications themselves are vague. The problem is of crucial importance for 
ethics, since belonging to some ontological class usually has serious implications for moral 
status. Except for human embryos at the early stages of development, real-life examples of 
entities with uncertain ontological—and thus moral—status include some products (real or 
only possible) of genetic engineering: the „embryo-like” products of therapeutic cloning or 
parthenogenesis, blastomeres that can be changed in laboratory conditions into totipotent 
stem cells, and induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS). Some philosophers have also argued 
that the uncertainty about the status of animals provides a reason for acting cautiously and 
treating them as if they had very high moral status. Peter Singer used this type of reasoning 
to defend vegetarianism. He considered an example of someone who is uncertain whether 
killing a pig in order to eat it is right or wrong. Singer claims that usually there are no 
pressing moral reasons for killing animals: the fact that one might prefer a dish containing 
meat to a vegetarian meal is hardly a matter of great moral significance for anyone. 
Therefore, even if we do not accept that animals have important moral status „it would 
seem better to give the pig the benefit of the doubt” [26, p. 252] (cf. [27]). 
The argument from normative uncertainty is visible in the Congregation documents: 
„it suffices that this presence of the soul be probable (and one can never prove the contrary) 
in order that the taking of life involve accepting the risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, 
but already in possession of his soul” [6, fn. 19] (cf. [7]). The structure of this argument is as 
follows: (1) we have to act in the face of uncertainty about the moral status of some entity 
(E) – either because we are not sure when it begins, or because we are not sure if it belongs 
to some ontological class, or because we are not sure which moral doctrine is the right one; 
(2) even if there are some reasons (r) to destroy E, they are not decisive; (3) if E belongs to 
this ontological class (or if E starts to exist at a particular moment of time or some moral 
doctrine is the right one), the moral status of E is full, i.e., equal to the status of an adult 
human being; (4) if the entity has full moral status, it is seriously wrong to destroy it and r 
does not justify it, whereas if it does not have such a high status we can destroy it without 
committing anything that is morally wrong; (5) rationality and morality require that we 
should act as if E had full moral status even if we do not believe that it has full moral status (I 
have discussed a similar argument in Polish in [28]). 
The argument presupposes a form of moral fallibilism: one can never be certain that a given 
view on ontological or moral questions is correct or true. No matter how strong someone’s 
views are about the ontological status of embryos, it is always possible („one can never 
prove the contrary”) that in fact early embryos have an ontological status such that we 
should treat them because of moral reasons as equal to adult human beings. If there is only 
a probability, no matter how small, that embryos have this kind of status, we should act as if 
they had souls indeed („mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to 
justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo”). 
Why does the exact probability not matter? The ANU makes use of the decision theory 
model of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty, that is, in situations where 
we are not sure, for example, what the ontological status of the embryo is and what its 
moral implications are. Usually, in cases of factual risk or uncertain consequences, to 
determine which course of action we should pursue, the decision theory model of reasoning 
recommends taking the subjective probabilities of various outcomes and combining them 
with the values we attach to the outcomes. The ANU appeals to analogical reasoning in the 
face of normative uncertainty: we should evaluate the subjective probabilities of different 
doctrines about the moral status of early human embryos and combine them with the 
disvalues attached by these doctrines to the destruction of embryos. If the disvalue attached 
by some doctrine to the intentional destruction of an embryo is substantial (or even infinite, 
if we give an absolutist interpretation to doctrines that strictly prohibit intentionally killing a 
person or something of similar status) this parameter dominates the calculus. The 
probability that embryos have full moral status could be minimal (or, in other words, the 
doctrine assuming that embryos have full moral status could be extremely unreliable, 
though not false), but the disvalue of the risk of intentionally destroying a being with full 
moral status will prevail, because in the moment of decision, we do not know whether it 
indeed has this kind of status or not. This reasoning has an important implication: when we 
act under normative uncertainty, we should not always act according to the normative view 
that in our opinion is most reliable. In the case of embryo research, the ANU does not claim 
that anyone should believe that early embryos have full moral status from the very 
beginning or the ontological status of persons. Even if we strongly believe (but we cannot be 
sure) that it is permissible to destroy human embryos until the 14th day after conception in 
order to conduct important scientific research, it is rational and moral to act in a 
precautionary manner: any rational and moral agent should act as if early embryos had full 
moral status (or as if they were persons, as if they had souls, etc.) This emphasis on 
pragmatic reasons (on the question „What should we do under normative uncertainty?” and 
not „What should we believe under normative uncertainty?”) distinguishes this argument 
from Pascal’s wager (although, strictly speaking, Pascal did not maintain that it is rational to 
believe in God, but rather, that it is rational to resolve on believing in God). 
It may seem that the ANU follows the traditional approach of Catholic moral theology 
developed in the 16th and the 17th centuries for resolving doubts [5]. This tradition makes a 
distinction between a doubt of fact and a doubt of law. In this first case, a decision maker is 
uncertain whether some particular act will or will not fulfill the law. In the second case a 
decision-maker is uncertain whether some particular moral rule is in effect (this approach 
models moral duties according to the natural law tradition: moral duties depend on 
objectively existing rules imposed by God and usually can be known by reason). The 
difference between these two approaches is crucial because Catholic moral theology used to 
claim that in the case of a doubt of fact always the safer course of action must be followed: 
we are not allowed to act if there is a probability that an innocent person will be killed or 
harmed. Whereas in the case of a doubt of law a decision-maker does not need certainty to 
act, even if human life is at risk. The dominant procedure is probabilism, which claims that a  
decision-maker is allowed not to follow a rule if there exists a probable opinion in favour of 
liberty (that is, that a particular moral rule does not have to be obeyed), even though the 
contrary opinion is more probable. Two other decision procedures on how to act in the case 
of a doubt of law are: equiprobabilism which claims that one is allowed to follow the opinion 
in favour of liberty only in cases when conflicting opinions are nearly equally probable; and 
probabiliorism which says that a decision maker may do it only when opinions in favour of 
liberty are more probable. Two factors were relevant to measure whether an opinion is 
more probable than another: the number of Church fathers supporting some opinion and 
their authority. Carol A. Tauer gives two examples in which probabilistic methods were 
accepted by the Church in the past: the castration of boys for religious choirs and the 
acceptance of slavery. In both cases the existence of conflicting opinions about the 
permissibility of these practices was taken as an argument in favor of liberty [5, p. 25].  
It is easy to notice that the ANU used in the recent Catholic documents treats 
uncertainty about the ontological status of early embryos and the moment of ensoulment 
differently: as a doubt of fact, not as a doubt of law. On the one hand this is problematic in 
the light of the Congregation’s own statement that „it is not up to the biological sciences to 
make a definitive judgment on questions which are properly philosophical and moral such as 
the moment when a human person is constituted.” So treating the question about the 
moment of ensoulment as a doubt of fact by the Congregation requires adopting quite an 
unusual understanding of the term „fact” that would include theological facts (e.g., 
„embryos have souls”). On the other hand, in the case of early embryos, there is not „a 
doubt of law,” because the moral rule expressed by the reliable authority (the Congregation) 
is clear: early embryos should be treated as persons. Tauer argues that this is a third 
category of doubt—theoretical doubt that is equivalent to a doubt of law and thus should be 
handled according to probabilistic methods. In the final section, I will show why these 
probabilistic methods are not always the proper approach and I will point out more 
fundamental problems with the ANU-type of reasoning. 
 
The ANU in bioethical discussions 
The ANU as an argument in favor of the pro-life view on the moral status of early embryos 
and its potential applications has been overlooked by many contemporary bioethicists, and 
the ontological ambiguity of early embryos (though not of the fetuses) is not widely 
recognized within the pro-life camp. Moreover, the ANU type of reasoning has also been 
recently applied to some embryo-like products of genetic engineering. In Dignitas Personae 
the Congregation claims that we should treat the products of human parthenogenesis, 
altered nuclear transfer, and oocyte assisted reprogramming (if someone were to carry out 
these procedures on human material) as human persons because there are:  
 
… questions of both a scientific and an ethical nature regarding above all the 
ontological status of the „product” obtained in this way. Until these doubts have 
been clarified, the statement of the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae needs to be kept in 
mind: „what is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral obligation, 
the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an 
absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo.” [6] 
 
This formulation suggests that the prohibition can be extended to other „embryo-like 
products” that are not enumerated explicitly in this document, even if there „is the mere 
probability that a human person is involved.” This means that the ANU could prohibit any 
procedure that leads to obtaining totipotent cells (which can become an embryo under the 
proper conditions). For example, it could be extended to the early-stage blastomeres 
extracted from an embryo that might also be totipotent and, at least in theory, capable of 
developing into a second embryo. Some philosophers have recently discussed a similar type 
of reasoning in the context of abortion [23, 29–31]. In one article by two eminent 
philosophers, Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, the authors claim that there is a group of 
Catholics who:  
 
… oppose early stage abortion while granting that it is far from certain that an early 
stage foetus is a person. They argue that it is possible that early stage abortion is not 
the intentional killing of an innocent person because it is not the killing of a person, 
and, therefore, that it may not be ruled out by absolutist prohibitions against the 
intentional killing of innocent persons. But, all the same, early stage abortion ought 
not to be allowed because we cannot be sufficiently confident that the early stage 
foetus is not a person. Their position is, precisely, that early stage abortion may or 
may not be something that is objectively wrong but it is certainly something that 
decision-ought not to be done. [30, pp. 270–271]2 
 
Their claim seems to be mistaken in the light of recent theological or doctrinal 
discussions by Catholics regarding the permissibility of early stage abortion. Admittedly, the 
Congregation claims that this kind of uncertainty about the personhood of early embryos 
exists, and that some scholars or theologians claim that the intellectual soul cannot be 
incarnated before the implantation process (Congregation calls it „nidation”). But as I have 
noted, today’s supporters of delayed animation (e.g., Ford [16]) claim that an embryo is 
animated just after the implantation (but not much later). Today, no Catholic maintains, as 
Thomas Aquinas did and as many others did until the 19th century, that a fetus is animated 
by an intellectual soul 40 days after conception (in the case of a male fetus) and 90 days (in 
the case of a female fetus). Since abortions are performed after implantation, the ANU type 
argument discussed by Jackson and Smith cannot be applied today by any „group of 
Catholics” to abortion (if there are Catholics who do not oppose early abortion, they 
probably have other justifications). This is the main reason why I concentrate not on the 
problem of abortion, but on the permissibility of acts that lead to the destruction of early 
embryos, and above all on research on human embryonic stem cells (since they are 
harvested from blastocysts 4–5 days after fertilization) and other moral issues concerning 
early embryos (e.g., the fate of spare embryos after in vitro fertilization, „morning-after” 
pills, or even some contraceptives).  
In this context, it is surprising that no one (as far as I know) has analyzed the ANU 
type argument in detail in the context of the permissibility of embryo research. A few 
bioethicists or philosophers have noticed the possibility that the pro-life view on embryo 
research can be interpreted this way, but their analyses are often oversimplified.  
For example, David Martin Shaw, who discusses a version of the ANU in two short 
paragraphs (he calls it „the argument from doubt”) of his paper about embryo research 
correctly, notices that the argument is often presented as an analogy: „if I am hunting with a 
rifle, and I see something move in the trees but am unsure whether it is a deer or a person, I 
am obliged not to shoot until I establish that it is in fact a deer: better safe than sorry” [32, p. 
                                                          
2 2 Jackson and Smith distinguish „decision-ought” from „objective-ought”: the first takes into consideration 
the epistemic state of an agent. 
219]. He is right that this is the traditional way of describing the problem of factual doubts 
by Catholic moral theologians, but he is mistaken in other respects. He says, firstly (and 
mistakenly, in my opinion), that the main problem with this argument is that it conflates 
empirical ignorance with conceptual uncertainty (he borrows the terms from Alex Mauron): 
we can resolve empirically whether or not the target is a person, but we cannot settle in the 
same way the issue of the ontological and moral status of embryos. This is certainly true, but 
it seems that the possibility and the method of resolving the uncertainty does not explain 
fully the difference between empirical ignorance and conceptual uncertainty: the 
correctness of a decision procedure under uncertainty (or ignorance) does not depend on 
whether it is possible to check the accuracy of this decision afterwards. For example, the 
correctness of the hunter’s decision to shoot or not depends on his evidence at the moment 
of shooting, not on the future possibility of checking whether the moving entity in the trees 
was a deer or a person (this problem is related to the discussions about objective and 
subjective—or „decision”—oughts; see, e.g., [30, pp. 268–271]). Secondly, Shaw says that 
the hunter should not shoot until he is sure that the target is not a person. Strictly speaking, 
the hunter will never have this kind of certainty at the moment of shooting; for example, he 
cannot rule out that some rival has not added hallucinogenic drugs to his morning coffee. 
Normally, we are allowed to proceed in these types of cases only if the risk of killing a person 
is negligible.  
Kevin Elliott, in a footnote to his article, distinguishes two different ways in which one 
might defend a pro-life view with an argument based on the „paradox of the heap” [33]. The 
first is grounded in metaphysical or theological arguments. For example, someone may 
believe in substance ontology and claim that after the fertilization, all changes that an 
embryo undergoes are merely „accidental” as opposed to „substantial.” 
The second is based on something like the ANU: a cautious response to uncertainty 
about the moral status of the embryo. However, in describing this argument, Elliott conflates 
uncertainty or moral fallibility with disagreement. He says that „there is often significant 
disagreement about the strength of the premises for these metaphysical or theological 
arguments,” and he maintains that for some pro-life thinkers, this disagreement is a reason 
for acting cautiously. It is true that there is disagreement about the moment of ensoulment 
among theologians. But the problem is that disagreement about moral issues among 
different scholars can exist even if every party is completely certain about his or her moral 
views. The ANU in my interpretation aims to be a model not only for decision-making under 
disagreement, but also for decision-making under uncertainty by fallible agents whose 
credences are divided between different moral doctrines (another short discussion of an 
argument similar to the ANU can be found in [34]).  
 
The critique of the ANU 
Now, I will demonstrate that the pro-life view, even in my interpretation, which is seemingly 
stronger than the standard one, has limited scope. It cannot be used to restrict promising 
research on human embryos, but it does have some interesting applications. I am going to 
focus on two problems, one general and one more specific: the first concerns the possibility 
of adapting absolutist moral doctrines to the decision theory framework; the second 
concerns intertheoretic value comparisons. 
In the third section of this article, I stated that the ANU makes use of the decision 
theory model of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty. One could claim 
that my description of the ANU is mistaken, because pro-life views are usually based on a 
deontological ethical framework that treats right actions as a matter of complying with rules 
and evaluates outcomes only in terms of the actions that produced them. Therefore, one 
could argue that this framework does not fit the decision theory framework which can be 
used only by consequentialist theories. But this does not have to be the case. Ethical 
doctrines usually give clear recommendations in situations where the results of actions and 
all morally relevant information are known [35]. For example, they disagree on what to do in 
socalled trolley cases: if you flip the switch, then you know one person will be killed for sure, 
whereas if you do not flip it, then five other people will be killed. In these kinds of cases, you 
are sure that they will be killed and you are certain that they are persons. But what to do 
when there is no such certainty about the results or – as in the case of embryo research – 
about the ontological status of some beings? Since deontology, like every other normative 
doctrine, must deal with uncertainties, it can be accommodated—as several authors have 
recently observed – ”in something like the standard decision-theory framework, and thus 
expected utility theory need not be thought of as a tool available only to the 
consequentialist” [36, p. 525]. 
Nevertheless, the decision theory model, when used to guide our action in moral 
terms and within the deontological framework, is highly controversial. It assumes that in the 
face of risk, we are rational if and only if we maximize expected value (whatever it is). The 
ANU assumes a similar model for an agent who wants to act morally in the face of 
uncertainty. When an agent wants to make morally correct decisions, she must obey the 
same principles of rationality that she should obey in any other kind of decisions. Therefore 
the ANU assumes a meta-moral obligation of maximizing expected moral value: this is not 
only a requirement of rationality, but also a requirement of morality. If one wants to act 
morally in situations of normative uncertainty, one should follow the rules of rationality as 
they are understood by the decision theory model.  
The main problem that the supporters of the ANU have to deal with consists in 
making intertheoretic comparisons of values. Normally, when we use an expected utility 
calculus, we use a common scale by which we can measure the values attached to these 
different outcomes (this is one reason why so many examples refer to money). But there 
does not seem to be anyway of making this kind of intertheoretic comparison of moral 
values between different theories or doctrines. The moral theories themselves cannot be a 
starting point since we need some metatheoretical tool to judge which action has the 
highest expected moral value in situations where our credence is divided between different 
moral theories (or between different views on the moral status of a human embryo). 
Let me demonstrate this problem with the example of destructive embryo research. 
The followers of the ANU try to argue that we are dealing, on the one hand, with the 
doctrine that ascribes a very high value to the embryos and, on the other, with theories that 
claim that destroying embryos does not matter from the moral point of view (for example, 
because early embryos are like normal human tissues). So, they argue, we should aim the 
safer course. Unfortunately for the prolife view this is not a proper description of the 
controversy. On the one hand, the supporters of the pro-life view indeed claim that since it 
is possible that early embryos have full moral status and no one can be sure that it is not so, 
everyone should treat embryos as morally equal to adult human beings. But on the other 
hand, the supporters of destructive human embryo research claim that embryo research 
may help many future people, either living now or those who have not been born yet—that 
it may lead to the development of therapies that lengthen lives, alleviate suffering, and 
allow parents to achieve their reproductive goals. Fervent supporters of human embryonic 
stem cell (hESC) research write: „Failing to pursue this research could result in thousands, 
perhaps millions, of avoidable deaths, not to mention great pain and suffering” [37, p. 307]. 
Moreover, embryo research also provides an opportunity to conduct basic research on the 
process of human development. Therefore, according to the supporters of destructive 
human embryo research, it would be extremely wrong to abandon this kind of research and 
the option of abandoning research would have a very negative value.  
How can we compare these two positions? How are we to „calculate” which option 
has higher expected moral value? This is not an easy task because we have to deal with at 
least two competing views which use different hierarchies of values. On the one hand, if one 
of the pro-life views is correct, then embryo research is strictly impermissible because 
embryos have full moral status. This is because they assign either infinite or extremely high 
disvalue to intentionally killing an entity of full moral status and only finite (or moderately 
high) disvalue to allowing people to die (let us assume that these deaths could be avoided by 
the therapies resulting from embryo research). This means that pro-lifers can agree that the 
expected benefits from embryo research could be enormous, but not so large as to justify 
killing entities with full moral status. On the other hand, if one of the pro-research views is 
correct, abandoning embryo research is very wrong, because we are missing a chance to 
save thousands of future people and we do not sacrifice anything of great moral significance 
by destroying human embryos in the process. 
The proponents of the ANU would have to show, firstly, that their argument works in 
situations in which we are dealing with at least two competing normative views about the 
moral status of early embryos, and secondly, that abandoning destructive human embryo 
research would indeed have higher expected moral value than continuing this kind of 
research. I claim that the followers of the ANU do not reach this second point: it is 
impossible to compare expected losses and benefits of doing or abandoning embryo 
research from a point of view which is external to any moral doctrine.  
In recent literature, I have found one serious attempt to describe a tool that could 
help in making intertheoretic comparisons of values. This is the „Principle of Equity among 
Moral Theories” (PEMT), which claims that „the maximum degrees of moral rightness of all 
possible actions in a situation according to competing moral theories should be considered 
equal” [23, p. 84] (the same is said about „the minimum degrees of moral rightness”). 
Unfortunately, this idea seems to be obviously mistaken because different moral views can 
strongly disagree about the moral value of the same action: they can disagree about how 
wrong or how right an action is. In the example discussed in this article, we are uncertain 
about which of two views on experiments on early embryos is correct: the first says that 
destroying embryos for research is strictly forbidden because they have as high a moral 
status as adults; the second says that research on embryos is not forbidden, but morally 
demanded, because the moral status of embryos is so low that the expected future gains can 
easily override the disvalue of embryo destruction. The PEMT cannot help to solve this 
dilemma because it would say that in this situation the worst possible action according to 
the first normative view (destroying embryo for research) should be considered equal to the 
worst possible action according to the second view (abandoning embryo research). The 
problem is that in the first case, we would do something gravely wrong (according to this 
normative doctrine): we would be killing large numbers of beings that have moral status 
equal to the status of adults to gain some uncertain future scientific benefits; therefore, we 
are committing one of the most morally horrible acts. However, in the second case we are 
doing something wrong, but probably not so gravely wrong within this 
normative view (there are many much worse categories of actions than abandoning 
destructive embryo research in this normative framework). Therefore, the PEMT is not the 
tool we are looking for: it cannot help in comparing different values according to different 
moral doctrines since it equalizes these values by definition (for more objections, see [38]). 
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the ANU type of reasoning works perfectly 
well. Suppose, for example, that John must decide whether to kill some living organism or 
not (this is a modified version of the example discussed by [24]). John believes that it is 
highly probable that from the moral point of view it does not matter if he kills this type of 
being or not, but he is not absolutely certain of his normative views (let us assume that his 
degree of credence is 0.99). This means that he thinks that there is a very small chance that 
killing this kind of organism is in fact morally wrong (his degree of credence regarding this 
view is 0.01). Therefore, given the view that is the most probable in his opinion, it would be 
neutral from the moral point of view to kill or not to kill this organism. But given the 
alternative view, it would be morally wrong to kill this type of organism and morally good 
not to kill it. If John wants to maximize the expected moral value of his decisions, he should 
choose not to kill this organism, even though he believes that the probability that killing this 
type of being is morally wrong is indeed extremely low. The application of the ANU in this 
type of reasoning seems to be correct, because here there is no problem with intertheoretic 
comparisons of values. John does not have to compare any values or disvalues between 
different moral doctrines or views on the moral status of this living organism, because one 
view says that everything he does in the situation is morally neutral. In these types of cases, 
the ANU would indeed give one a reason to prefer the „morally safer” option, only if the 
probability that this option is morally correct is greater than zero (but see two recent 
critiques of this kind of argumentation [39, 40]). 
The above example has an interesting implication in the case of early embryo 
protection: the ANU would in fact prohibit destroying early embryos in situations in which 
there are no prospects for achieving anything of moral worth (e.g., destroy them just „for 
fun”). Nevertheless, the decision theory model of moral reasoning in situations of normative 
uncertainty is a dangerous ally of the pro-life position. At first, the ANU seems to help to 
defend pro-life views in the case of embryo research because it promised to reconcile the 
uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos with the certainty about normative 
obligations, and was based on a cautious response to the ambiguity about the ontological 
status of early human embryos. However, the ANU does not withstand closer inspection, 
and it turns out that the supposed ally of the pro-life position cannot be used to justify 
limiting promising research on early embryos.  
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